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EC - U.S. RELATIONS 
.General situation 
The current d;fficult phase in relations between the U.S. and the 
Community shows no signs of easing. Divergencies in both polit~cal 
and economic philosophy remain unresolved and compromise solutions 
are both difficult to negot_iate and fragile when found; whether in 
economic and commercial questions directly in the Co~munity's 
r.esponsibility (such as agdcultural trade disputes amfthe steel 
complaints) or in those of a broader political charact~i-with 
indirec~ effects Cg.efence policy_, relations with Latin America or 
relations with the· Eastern Block). · 
I 
\1 
,Aside from difficulties and pressu~es arising from the ongoing recession, 
a great part of the tensions in the e6m~~rciil sector appear to be 
a result of the rigid ideolo~ical stance.of the Administration of 
President Reagan. Its domestic policy of reduction of government 
'engagement in the· economy and:{of thi liberation of market forces, 
translates in exte_rnal policy 'into an ins'.fs·tan·ce on "free and fafr 
\• - ,., . -
trade" and opposition to subsidi~t:Pr aids, by for~ign governments. 
~ _· .. -..* ~ .. 3:~~ r-~~,-- --. , '· 
The present budgetary difficulties in ccingress, with the close prospect 
· of Congressional elections,· accentuate -t~ Administration's search for 
further acceptable cuts in spend{ng, inter alia in subsidies and 
therefore - to make them palatable domestically - =inevitably to a 
hardening of its demands on it~-~~mmercial-partners. · · 
. -. 
' •-:,-".;.. The overall feeling of the Administration is that the Subsidy Code in GATT 
is not strong enough. While it realises that formal renegotiation is 
out of-the question, it is endeavour1ng through a series of pointea actions 
to obtain interpretations of the Code as closely as possible in confor~ity 
with its position., Sue~ an oyerri~ing preoccupation is manifest in the 
majority of the current acute trade problems between ~he Community ana 
the U.S. : steel, countervailing duty pr0cedure, agricultural GATT actions 
and the export credits disputes (minimum rates and the countervailability 
of consensus rate~.> 
1.3. Although complete figures are not yet available, indications are that 
the overall balance of trade in 1981 of the C~m~unity has improved by 
chmparison with th~ h.uge deficit of S65.6 milliards experienced in 1980 
(Table 1·attached). By contrast, that of the U.S. deteriorated to about 
S39.8 milliards from 137.1 ~illiards. An important part of this· 
development, from both points of vie_w, was a decrease in the bi lateral 
~eficit between the Community and the u.c. Again, figures are not 
:omplete, but the provisional estimate is that the deficit will be about 
114 mi(fiards, down f~o~ S25 milliards. 
-~~~\ .· . 
. . . .. . ........ 
It is clear that the pr·~cipat reasons underlying this development are 
firstly the strength of tt.E- dollar whose value rose from its low point 
of 0.69 ECU in July 198( to O.~; ECU in August 1981 and has since 
remained at levels ~he~~ 0.91 ECU; and secondly, the continuing weakness 
These combined influences have led to a 
,( ' f ~ 
l, I.;;_· - • '-• • ,_ 
whil~ EC exports hav0 p~~tormed reasonably well to give an increase of 













. 2. Principal Commercial Problems 
There are three principal a~eas in whi~h commercial problems arise: 
steel, ~griculture and East-West trade. 
-2.1. Steel 
Anti~o,6p,ng· arid a:\ti-sufi>s.j.dy t.~mplaints by the U.S~. ind4stry thre·aten 
Community exports of some 4 million tons of steel worth over S2 
milliards. On 11 June, the Department of Commerce published its 
preliminary finding on the existenct of subsidies in the affirmative. 
EC exports of the steel' p'roduc;ts concerned now become l iclhle to counter-
vailing duties at rates up to 40~ for British Steel Corpotation, 30% 
for Sacilor (France) and 20X for Usinor (F~ance)-and Cock~rill-Sambre 
(Belgium)., Efforts by'the Commission to find a compromise solution 
which could avoid a complete block of EC exports have so far been 
unsuccessful.· (See Anna.x.,I) • 
... :~ 
.. ,. ' 
2.2. Agriculture 
As noted above, the Reagan Administration ~as set its face sternly against 
all forms of subsidy~ The U.S.);~els itself strongly affected by Community 
exports, in its view aided by r~stitutions, -to-th'ird markets. The-
Community insists that its restitutions are' .fully compatible with its 
GATT obligations since they are-l'fot ~fid ~1>btaining an inequitable share 
of the world market, and in that they do no-t cause prejudice to American 
producers.. It is the Community' !f· view that...Jt cannot deny to its own 
agriculturists a share of a ,rapidly_~growing 1-'0rld market. (See Annex II). 
2.3~ East-West Trade 
' Significant differences qf v·fe·w continue.to separate the EC and the U.S. 
on this subject. This can be explained by the far greater significance 
of East-West trade for the EC (8% of two-way trade) than for the U.S. 
(2%), on the one hand, and by a different assessment of measures to be 
taken against the USSR and Eastern Europe on the other hand. This has led 
to some frictions, ¥or example, in the respective attitudes to trade with 
the USSR (following the Afghanistan and Polish episodes), and on the 
extension of credits to the USSR.· The 18 June 1982 decision of President 
Reagan to extend the-December 1981 sanctions on the export of oil and gas 
equipment to the USSR~ through the adoption of new regulations to include 
equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad as well as 
equipment produced under licences issued by U.S. companies - adds 
.considerably to already existing tensions. 
Apart from creating new difficulties in relations between Member States and 
Eastern Europe, this decision might be particularly harmful to the commercial 
interests of numerous EC companies, as uell as to Member States' medium 
and longer term gas supplies. Moreover, it raises the problem of the 
extraterri\9rial applicability of U.S. law and is contrary to declarations 
mt'i? at the;Versailles Summit (Annex III). 
2.4. DISC (Domestic International Sale: Corporations) 
The United States actio:i 0r 1lleged subsidies to Community steel exports 
to the Uni~eg State~ rn~ld lead thP Communitv to consid~~ the United 
States system of DISC i.w~ereoy ·.c..-·.,.:.,:..c :o .... ::i:..,.:.,or ,·2:; .:i;"' .. ~Ge rc.n\;$~ ci 
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found 
time payment of part of U.S. corporate taxes on export income>. The Gatt has 
that this pract;ce, which costs the U.S. Treasury approaching one bill;on 
dollars a year, must be· regarded as an export subsidy. The Commission 
w;ll iherefore prepare proposals for consideration by the Counc;L as to 
the act;on wh;ch the Community might take under the GATT rules <see 
Annex IV). 
2.5. Export Credits 
2.6. 
This presents two aspects; on the ~ne hand, there is some difference over 
the minimuin rates to be established in the "Consensus" of the OECD; on 
the other, there has ~r~sen.the question ~s to whether-cf~dits granted · 
via government·agencies, within the limits of the consen.$Us agreement 
are countervailable under the GATT Subsidy Code (see Annex V). 
I /I : 
/ Economic Policy 
' 
'<:; ,.• 
The Adm1nistration's 'tight.money' policy has had together with the 
budget defi~its of both of the Fede~at·arid State Governments, the effects 
of maintaining interest rates at very high levels, and of raising the 
value of the dollar. This has had international repercussion·s, in 
placing constraint~ on the po~)~y ~hoices of trading partners,. 
not least EC Member States, ard the dollai-~xchange rates inter alia in 
the purchase price ·of petroleum wht~ ·;s~nominated in dollars. 
~ . ····~--.. ~ ..... -.... _. 
- ... _ .. -· - .. 
During the Versai.l les Summit, certain und.ertakings were made Con u.s. 
intervertions to control the ex-change rate).. It is to be ·hoped that 
the implementation of these will ~radually ease the probl~m • 
. i. 
2.7. Others t "": .. 
Contained in the annexes are notes on some other specific points i~ 
Ec-u.s. relations viz : 
·- Government Procurement Code 
Ap~lication of Community law to Multinationals 
Energy Pol;cy 
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Plus des deu,c tiers des e~portations communautaires d'acier vers l-es 
Etats-Unis - un poste important Cpres de 3 mrds de dollars> d' la ba-
lance commerciale deja largement deficitaire de la CE - est l'objet 
d'enQuetes ~nti-dumping~et anti-subvention. 
' ,···· 
-
D'emblee La Communaute a conteste le bien fonde des accus~tions lancees 
contre elle par l'ind~strie americaine •. Les aides etroitement controlees 
accordees a notre industrie ont pour obj.et la restructuration et la 
' reduction des capacites~e production et ne peuvent, pou~ cette raison, 
itre considerees comme d~s·subventions a~ titre du GATT. Err outre, avec 
une part du marche americain de 6 r., nous n·e· pouvons etre tenus pour 
responsables des problemes de 't'industrie siderurgique americaine, pro• 
blemes imputables a la reces~ion~ .. 
.. 
. • . 
. ·. -.. 
Le Departement du Commerce a determint; a fitre preliminaire, le 10 juin 
que Les export at ions co.rnmunautS1-ires erf=cay-se, benef i ci ai ent de sub vent ions. 
Les taux de subventions ~onstates vont de 40 r. pour British Steel Corpo-
ration,. 30. a 20 r. pour Les siderurgi stes .fr..ancai s, 18,3 r. pour la si_de-
rurgie italienne, a des montants .: faibles ou negligeables pour Les 
siderurgie allemande - dont certaines ent.reprises sont completement mises 
hors ~e cause-, luxembourgeoise et·~eerlandaise. 
I' 
t~~ ~r~J~ttt ~t ,~~1~~~ ;~rt "4~~~t,s a J~ cana: ~~t~;e :c~~erc~al e~:re 
producteurs q•.J'i°L co:wier,dra;: de t"ancner au seul regara des regles de 
la legis(ation americaine en La matiere. Le~ consequences commerciales 
directes qu'elles po~rraient avoir pour la Communaute sont tonsiderables 
Cperte immediate de pres d'un milliard de commerce>. Mais leur enjeu va 
bien au-dela : 
d'abord ces enquetes mett~nt en cause des programmes destines a permet-
tre et a accelerer la re~tructuration ei la reduction des capacites de 
l'industrie europee~ne • 
. - Les decisions du DOC soulevent de graves questions de principe concer-
nant L'interpretation du concept de subvention et le calcul du montant de 
la subvention. Elles comportent a cet egard des innovations dont Les 
implications considerabies depassent largement le seul secteur de 
L'acier. Les decisions unilaterales et extremes du DOC sont inaccepta-
bles pour la CE qui Les contestera devant le Comite du Code su~ Les 
subventfci·ns (15 juillet). Elles font peser une lourde menace sur le 
fv,,ct ionriemen't du c'ode sur l es Subventions, l 'un des acqui s exxent i e ls 
du Tokyo Round et contribuent' a aggraver Les. tensions qui a.ffectent 





La Communaute, a L'occasion du Conseil des Ministres des 21 et 22 juin, 
a reagi avec fermete aces decisions, indiquant qu'elle Les contesterait 
au GATT~ et qu'elle en saisirait egalement· le Comite de L'acier·de l'OCDE • 
. . 
Se referant aux decisions prises lors du Sommet de Versajlles concernant 
Les echanges intern~t~onaux, notamment en ce qui concerne la prochaine 
reunion ministeriel1e du GATT, le Conseil a en outre so~ligne la necessite 
''d'agir au plus haut ni~eau afin d'engager Les discussions constructives 
qui permett·rpnt de degager des solutions" a ce pro~LE~me.:.;. -·.· 






















._ ANNEX II 
Agriculture 
This general attitude of the u.s. is clearly reflecttd in its~ttitude 
towards the CAP. While the U.S. Administration wants to cut dra~tically 
agricultural SJpport expenditure which has already been declining for 
several years, it is up in arms against the constantly increasing level 
of expenditure in the JC. 
, , ... ···• 
.... 
'1. 
-- :2. On the one hand, there is an increasing perceptfon in th.:e U.S. that the 
3. 
EC is taking, throug~ subsidisation~ a more than equitable ~hare of th~ 
intern~tional market: Domesti~ pressure is also buildi~g up in the U.S. ' 
as evidenced by the/filjng of Sectic,n 301 petitions on.sugar, canned 
fru,it and rahins, pout:ciry, pasta arid wh~at flour~ . 
Csee details in annexes A, B, C, D and E). 
' . . . ~ " 
In another case Cdesc~ibed iri ~etail in annex F), the United States 
has challe"ged the preferential. tariff .regimes on-citrus fruits granted 
by the rom~unity to"Mediterrane~n producer, as ~ontrary to GATT~ The 
Comr.i,mi.ty holds that. the agreements ,re_ i.n conformity. with its GATT 
obligations. ~ ·--; ~:~~".: 'f.,t'".'~~ _" • . • 
4. Mor<:·over, although the U.S. doe~ not officially put into Question the · 
basic pr~ticip°les of the CAP, the v,tdous -d'ecclarations made at th_e_ 'highest 
level se~m to show that the objective is to obtain some fundamental changes 
in th~?°:)C'Ai', st·a·rt ltlft from t-be L~.ve_t,_ of suppo,~t prices up to the export 
policy, i.e •. a. frontal attack _very· similar to the one ~xperienced ;n the, 
beginning of the Jokyo Round. It is in this context that one has to see 
the strong U.S. reaction to the possibilit~ of installing a tax on 
vegetable oils. 
5. Other r.l)ncP.rns· of the U.S. with the Community's agricultural polic'y 
includP: ' 
(a) th~ fear that the Community will install a tax on·vegetable oils 
(mentioned above>. Th~ u.s~ arg~es that such a tax would influence 
consumption of.soyabean oil, which is imported either in the form 
of soy~beans for crushing or ~s pure oil from the -U.S., and would 
therefore be in violation of GATT conce~sions. Indications are that 
the U~S. re~ponse to such a tax would be sharp. 
(b) the possibility that the EC mi~ht t~ke action to unbind the zero 
duties on corn gluten, dried distillers' grains and other feed 
ingredie~t~ would als0 risk rer~l1ation. Imports of these goods 
- into the Community from the U.S. have been increasing because of 
hibh.EC prices. (see dttails in annex G). 
t' (c) the p&~sible extension of- CAP export policies through long-term 
bilateral agreements with thi.rd countries. The U.S. would consider 







ANNEX II A 
, 
; 
S U C R E 
1. Suite aux consultations au titre de l'article 12 du Code intervenues 
·le 16 fevrier dernier a l'inithtive du Presi~~t du Comite d~s .Sub-
ventions, Les deux parties ont cherche, mijiS sans y pafvenir, une 
solution satisfaisante au difterend qui Les oppose, dans le cadre de 





2. Les Etats-Unis ont renouvele leur demande pour un reglement pratique 
du differend sans to~tefois preciser l~ nature de l'actiori souhaitee; 
cette der~i~re devr~it toutefoii me~t~~-~n terme au manque a gagner 
que Les producteurs-rattineurs amer~cai~s subissent, tant sur le march• 
interne que su(' celui d<'exportations, eh raison de la depression des 
pri>c dont la Communaute serait responsable·. 
3. La Communaute a rappele qu~ le~producteurs europ~ens sont tout aussi 
preoccupes de l'etat aciuel d~-~~rche puisqu~tls doivent maintenant 
fin,mcer l'integralite des restitu.tio-n~ plfr~es pour l'exp0,rtation des 
sucres co,..m1Jnautaires. La COIM!tf.'1,lllt~+a- e,u;lu .qu'au stade actuel; aorb 
la decision qu'elle a prist? de stocker"i mio de tonnes, elle puisse 
prendre 9es mesures supplementaires unil~terales; toutefois, ell~-a 
·propose d'entamer un exercice multiLateral~~ans le cadre du GATT en 
vue de re~~dier a l'ensemble des facteurs affectant ;Les niveaux de prix • 
. -. 
. -
4. Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas pu ~e prononcer sur cette offre et l'ensemble. 
de la Qvestion est actuellement en discussion devant le Comite des Sub-
ventions q~i exa~ine les possibilitfs de solution pratiQue. Des infor-
~,t~oni ,.~~~nt~s 1~~:~.~r! ~u·~- ~'!S? :as !XCl~ ~~e Les ~!;~s--~~s 
• S. :i c~• ~ff~rti n'~b~utis~,nt pas, Les c3~tie1, com~e Le p~e.:~: ~e i 3 
de L'article 17, ont la possibilite, a partir du trentieme jour Qui 
suit celui de la demande·de concilia:ion introduite le 6 avril, de 







I • i. 
, . 
' . ANNEX ll B 
----
FRUITS EN CONSERVE ET RAISINS SECS 
• 
.1. Deux reunions de consultations biLaterales se sont tenues avec res Etats-
.LJnis au 'titre de L'article XXIII 8 1 du GATT resp~ctivement Les ZS' fevrie.r 
. et le 29 avri l 1982. En bref, Les arguments avanc•s de part et d' autre 
sont les suivants: · 
- 2. ETATS-UNIS .· 
. I 
Les aides que La Communaute octroie a .la production des fryits en conserve 
(en particulier· aux pech~s.,en conserve) sont excessives ; elles stimulent 
indument la production communautaire; ertes ont pour effet de reduire les 
importations en provenance des pays tiers~ · · · · 
, 
Ence qui concerne les raisins secsi L'aide·~ ete 1ntroduite le·1er janvier 
1981 suite a l' adhesion de. la· Grece. Les A·mer1 ca1ns ·cra1gnent un, chute de 
leurs exportations vers la CommunauU. ,._ ._: .· • .. 
3. CEE 
Fruits en conserve 
------------------L'~vol,,tion des importations ne conf_i.rme pas l')S crain.tes. america1nes. 
Oecuis L'institution de l'aide tt_n 1978, ·ta Communaud a ~edui.t le montant 
de l'aide. 
Les difficultes actuelles du marche sont principalement dues a d'autres 
exportateurs CTurquie,) qui offrent des prix extremement bas~ L'aide intro-
duite le 1er Janvier 1981 n•est que l'heritage de l'aide anterieurement 
conced.ee par la Grece a ses producteurs. 
La sit~ation concurrentielle pour Les .Americains n'est pas ~hangee suite a 
l'adhesion de la Grece, car deja Les producteurs grecs beneficiaient de 
L'aide et, deja, Les raisons sees grecs.beneficiaient de la franchise a 
l'importation de'la Communaute. Oe plus, Les Etats·Unis ont vendu deja une 
quantite superieure a ceLle de l'annee derniere, alors que Les exportations 
(intra et extra> de la Grtce sont tr~s inferieures a la moyenne. 
4. Parmi Les qoatre produits ayant fait l'o.bjet de la consultation peches et 
poires en conserve, cocktail de fruits, raisins sees, ce·sont ces derniers 
a~xQuels les Americains attachent Le plus d'importance. La d~legation ame-
ricaine a de~ande Que La Communaute modifie Le regime des aides afin d'eviter 
toute interftrence avec Les cou~ants d'exportation des produits concurrents 
de Cal ifornie. 
Geneve. Selon la legislation~americaine (Section 301), le terme pour pre-






• ANNEX II C 
V O L A I L L E 
.,. 
1. Le 17 septembre 1981 la "N,,t iona l Broilers Counc H" ~ depod 
une plainte devant le USTR par laQuetle elle soutient oue les restitu-
t.ions octroyees par la Communaute vfolent les articles 8 et 10 du Code 
antisubventions. Le 28 octobre, le USTR decidait d'ouvrir une enquete 
.et le 13 novPmbre les autorites ameri'caines demandaient a la Communaute 
d'entrer en consultation sur la base de l'article 12-fi t·et 3 du Code. 
La Cc-:,munaute, es.timant que les Etats-Unis n'avaient pas fourni l 'element 
de "preuve" prevu dans cet arti.cle, o'est ent~ee en consultation avec 




2. Les Etats-Unis sout.iennent oue te·s restitutions accordees 
par la Communaute: 
- ne sont · pas compat {bl.es avec l 'article XVI du GATT, 
- ont un effet nefaste sur Aes interets americains, 
. - -~ . -
- ont permis aux oir1Je pr~ridr .. ""-"()1.us qu'une part eq•itable du 
·marche mondial, -
- permettent a la Communaute devl•ndre i des pri,c sensible111ent 
inferieurs ~ ceux de la concurrence. 
Les Etats-Unis ont aussi demande d'entrer·en 1consultation au 
sujet d~s subsides accordes sur un plan national par la France. 
3. Lors des consultations du 16 fevrier 1982, la Communaute a 
conteste, c~mme dan; le cas farine, la periode de reference anterieure 
prise en consideration par Les Etats-Unis (1964-66, periode pendant 
laquelle la co~munaute n'accordait pas.de restituti~ns). 
Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas ete en mesure de fournir l'element 
de preuve demontrant ·que la politique c9mmun~utaire aurait cause un 
prejudi~e aux interets americains. 
La Communaute s'est declare prete.i poursuivre les consultations 
mais Les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas prononces sur 'la suite qu' H y a lieu 
de reserver a la question. 
i,~ . 
4. . Le d~la~ qu't le USTR pour pr~senter Les recommandations au 
Pr~side~t exoire le 28 juin 1982 •• 
~" '···- ~~~~ ' 0 s Etats-Unis ont demande officiellement des 
'{rt. 7, § 1, du Codr 
concernant : 
a> le mode de calcul des subventions octroyees par la CE pour la volaille, 







P A T E S 
• 
1. Le 30 novembre dern;er,' le USTR a accepte une p•tit;on ;ntrodu;te 
par la National Pasta AssQciat;on le 16 octobre 1981 au titre de la 
section 301 du "Trade Act" de 1974. Le USTR devra pr•senter ses reco11un-
dations au Prtsident au plus tard le 30 juin 1982. 
2. La N.P.A. et le USTR estiment que pour Les pates, la Communaut• 
accorde des restitutions A l'exportation d'une fa~on incompatible avec 
l'article 9 du Code; celui-ci interdit Les subsides a l'exportation pour 
Les produits autres que certains produits primaires. 
Les Etats•Unis sont d'avis.,,que le degre de transformation auquel est sou11h 
le ble dur pour produire des pates commercialisables est si important qu'il 
ne permet pas de considerer Les pate~ comme un produit prim;jre. Le 
·2 decembre Hs ont en consequence demande des consul tat ions au titre de 
l'article 12.1. / 
3. La Communaute ne par:_tage pas l'interpretation°americaine de l'article 9; 
elle octroie, en effet, des'restitutions a l'exportation pour Les produits 
agricoles qui sont incorpores dans toute·une serie d~ ''produits transformes" 
et si, a la suhe d'un pa~l, ce 'systeme deva~t etre juge incompatible avec, 
Les dispositions de l'Accord Ge~eral, il devrait etre _profondement modifie, 
sinon suppr;me, avec des consequences tres grave~ pour certains courants 
d'echanges traditionnels et le secteur economique_ qui les alimente. -
- ..... - .... 
4. En raison de ce caractere dP"prllid~'i la Communaute s'est ·inhia-
lement refus~e d'entrer en consul tat ion avec les Etats-Unis au titre des 
dispositions ·de l'article 12.1 du Code et a de.m_ande la consthutfon d'un 
groupe de travail sur l'interpretation ~e l'artlcle 9. 
5. La question a ete debattue le 3 ~t -12 mais et le 1·avril. La 
Commu~aute, appuyee par la Finlande, le Pakistan et la Suisse, a soutenu 
que Les possibilites de conciliation n'etaient pas epuisees et qu'il n'etait 
pas opportun de creer d'abord un "groupe special", et apres un groupe de 
travail pour interpreter l'article 9 comme le demandaient Les Etats-Unis; 
en effet, les travaux du panel auraient ete limites a l'examen des faits 
et n'auraient pas pu faire avancer la _question fondamentale de l'interpre-
tatlon. 
6. f;nalement, le president du Comite subventions a suivi les Etats-lJnis, 
appuyes par le Bresil, l'Australie; le Canada, la Nouvelle-Zelande_et le 
Japon. Lors de sa reurijon du 29-30 avril, le meme Comite.s'est mis d'accord 
sur le mandat, et en principe,la composition du groupe special. Entretemps, 
le Panel a ete f.orl'lel lement .constitue a part; r du 14 juin. 1982, sous la pre-
sidence de M •• METTEL (Ambassadeur d1Autriche>. Les travaux debuteront debut · 
juil let. 
) 
.... ~ ,i •. - :.5,:;,,. 
.. .: :.- ;:. - .... ... -. .- ----··· . 
' 
. ".-,. 
ANNEX II E 
-
US ACTION ON EEC WHEAT FLOUR EXPORTS 
1. In September 1931 the US ooened up procedures under the new code on 
subs;dies and countervailing duties concerning EEC wheat flour exports. 
After initial unsuccessful consultation and conciliation procedures, 
'the quest ion was entrusted to a GATT panel. 
· 2. The complaint which was initially based on Articles 8 and 10 of the 
subsidies code (more than equitable share of world.export tradf and 
price un-iercuttini> has been further complicated by the introduction 
(~fter the ;nitial consultation and conciliation stage) of a further 
request under Articlt 9 on whether or not wheat flour can be considered 
a "primary product" (refunds· can only be accorded to pr ;.mary products 
and a definition for flour ·as non primary would render export refunds 
illegal under the GATT). ; · 
I J • 
3. T~e Panel which first met in February 1982 is compo~ed of Ambassado~ 
Suzuki of Japan (Chaifn:i~n) and Messrs H9bson (Canada) and Lempen 
(Switzerland). Having met three times and received memoranda from 
·both sides the p~nel is presently in the ·process of drawing-up its 
report. 
·-.· , 4. The issues at stake and on which in one way .or another the Panel 
• 
' will have to pronounce itself are: 
,._. ~·;...... ....... 
Ca> whether or not Community.-?efuri~s-,..tfJW• led to price undercutting 
by EEC.trarlers; 
-- --(b) if the refund system has resulted in the EEC acquiring more than 
an "P.quitable" share of world flour trade; 
-
<c> whether or not EEC refunds are a permanent source of uncertainty 
on the world flour market; and 
.. < d) if. wheat flour can or U'l'1,t be considered a "primary product". 
, 
5. Under Section 301 USTR must make a recommendation to the President not, 
later than : 
. 
- ?~"lOPJhs a.ftP.r initiation of the investigation in export subsidy cases 
·brought un'i~r -~rt icli ·12 .1 'bf the Corle; 
- 8 ~onths ~fter initiation of the investigation in other subsidy cases, 
includinq those brought un1er Article 12.3 of the Code • 
• Cn tti~ 1rou~ds that USTR rfecided to treat this case on SepteMber 29, 1981 
tr,P. .J,Jt•? for IJ~TR recommen lit i,m·~ i;,_ 11,ty 29, i93?.. ·too1~ver, thP. Pa,.,t:?l 's 
f~nal report is not expecterl before J~ne; and even th.en the procedure 
will not be comoleted because under Article 1~ of the code two further 
st a1es a'(~ envi sa3ed : recom!"lendat ions from the Com:nittee on Subsidies 
and·countervailing Measures on .,.)1., t~·~ p-1rth; ,iqht resolv'? the 
di :;,)·1t,, .)'\1 P.V!ntually th'? ·":Jthbrisation of· countermeasures if these 





ANNEX II F' 
-
·A·G RUM ES 
1. Des consultations au titre de l'article X~II1i1 se sont tenues_ 
le 20 avrH avec les Etats-unis. L'odg·foe de cette affaire remonte 
a nove~bre 1976 ou les producteurs d'a1rumes arnericains avaient 
depose une plainte au titre de la Section 301 du Trade Act (legislation 
donnant au President pouvoir de prendre des mesures de retors·ior,>, 
alleguant que Les accords preferentiels entre la Communaute et certains 
p.1yr. ,.,erfiterraneens violaient l 'article I du G~TT, annulaient 
' cert~ines concessions tarifaires et affectafent defavotablement Les 
exportations americaines d'agrumes vers la CEE. Depuis ~ors, ce sujet 
a f3it l'objet de discussions e~ consultations, for~eltes et informelles, 
, au titre di l'accord Casey/Soames (1) Cmars et juillet 1980> et au 
titre.de,l'article ~XII§ 1 du ~ATT <~~tobre 1980). 
/ 
Apres un silence de pres d'un an, l'Administration Reagan a brusquement 
ressort i. Cette aff aire\en decembre 1981, indiquant QU 'en. l I absence de 
neq:.;t~i,tions en vue d'une reduction·tarifaire, les Etats-Unis porteraient 
l 'aft''affe a,.rt;·AT-i"~ lnt-er.f:oge.s,.. sur le point de· savoir si l 'Administration 
mesurait bien les consequences d'une telte action - qui signifiait la 
fin de l'accord Casey/S~am~s -~les representants·de l'Administrat1on 
americaine, venus en janvier '/t.'Bruxelles, -av~ient indique que· l~s 
implications pol H iques d1u('le· tel.lP.-'<iec ;~·;_on . ."had been- fully considered". 
- ~ : ~~f~~~- ~<,l~ ... , ... ~ ~~ • .. • • 
Lors de la consultatfon tenue le 24 a·v'r-il-~ les Americ,1ins ont enc,re une fois 
rlecl~r~ ~u'a leur avis Les.preferences tarifaire~ accordees par la 
Commun;)ute aux pays mediterraneens sont ·contraires aux dhpositio-ns 
du GATT et qu'elles annulent des ·avantages auxquels Les Etats-unis 
ont rlroit. · · 
' 2. Le r"?presentant de la' Cornmunaute · a avertj la delegation 
americaine que si les Etats-unis avaient· l 'intention de de111ander la 
constHution d'un "panel" ils auraient du clafrement denoncer l 'arran-' 
gement ·casey/Soames. 
\ 
Il s'agjt d'une affaire tres delicate et politiquem~nt tres sen5ible 
pour la Com:nunaute, qu; pourrait ·t? plus creer :fas 1iffic;ltes ;,nportantes 
pour la bonne tenue de la reunion ministerielle du GA·rr ·de l 'automne. 
Oe l'avis.de la Communaute les arrangements preferentiels en faveur 
des pays mediterraneens sont acceptes oar le GATT et sont pleinement 
c~nformes aux dispositions de l'article XXIV. 
3: Selon Les derni.res•inf~rmations, le Gouvernement amer,cain s'appr~te 
a demander la constitution d'un panel sur La politique de la CE dans 
l~ domaine des agrumes, sous l'Art. XXIII:2 du GATT. La demande serait 
i~troduite au cours de la reunion du Conseil GATT du 29 juin • 
(1) Il est rappele que l'accord en question est un arrangement officieux 
et non publie qui a ete neanmoins strictement respecte, jusqu'a ce 
' .... . I"' "": ~ ""' r r· ~· ~ - ~ ~. "'· ,; ... ... ..' .... - ~ ~ ,..· ":', ,,. ... "" \ 'y-, .. : , ... - :- ..,_ ,,.. ~- ,.../ .: ... ,.. : ~ I" !: 
pays et de ne pas solliciter de preferences inverses moyennant l'en-




- ~ ... ANNEX II G 
CEREALS SUBSTITUTES : CORN GLUTEN FEED . 
., 
B.1c~JrO)Jl'l<l 
1. :'\:1 i.'1!X>rtMt ele:ncnt of the Com111.is:;ion's a,)pro.,ctr on a.:,ricultural 
price:; i:; a policy of •Jr,rlu;il rc,1li·.Jl1lilCnt of E!~t.:: cereals prices 
\Jith u:-; do:~"?stic pricf'."s. To m.Jke J.nY eventual s,1erifices dcmanl'.!ed 
of· Cor.tnunity producers more p.,latable the Com11iss.ioq is ~>roposirq 
that in parallel action be .tak<m ·on cereal substitute ifllt)Orts. 
In :i, Jrlition to measures on cc::re,11 brans taken in the context of 
. the price p."lek~e, the Cormtission' s -~nmunication to the Council 
of 1.') l\pril cnvisa.Jf":'!'- ilction on !rnnioc anct corn 1luten f~ed inp>rts~ 
2. 'n1c~ pror10sals rej"~riin:J m.1ni~ - which fores~e a .limitation on 
i":lr))rt:-1 through a system of 'pJot,ls nece~sitating a bilateral 
,'l !r(:·•:oont With '!'11ailand ·M•i il te::tporary no:lification of too G,\'IT 
bi11 linJ - ,h.we alrca· ly rcC'r>iW'd an "accord ,ie principe" -from the 
'11) Committee'• 'l'he. Co;~.ission 1S approach ·on <:'Orn gluten fe<!d 
(CGF)., · on the other hanrf;· .'i·s nora controvorsi:il. 
··. .._, 
\4 - '."''. 
3. F~r (~ciF the. Corrmission ~r~.'ptt'S.~_i.f.t_J~~: mand.-ite _ to open r;ATI' Art.XXVIII 
n•·Joti,1tions in order to-mo~lify,··on :a~teill~x:>ra.ry tx1s1s, the 1,r,?sent 
G\'rI' bin iinJ on CGF. 'me nn.lifk.1tion woultl involve replac1il.J the 
pret.'!nt ~iuty-free bindinJ with a tarlff ']OOta for 3 •. , tonnes-
(corrc~ponding to imports i.n-1981). also duty-freP.. lmjX)rts above 
the lP.vel would be subject to··-a_(dissue:.sive) lt:?vy. 
' 4. In discussions so far in the 113 Conmittee :t.:?:-rvx'r States are 
clivi·bi on the CGF proposal : France, Ireland, Greece and D:?nmark 
could broadly accept the Corrm.ission 's a~roach, while the other 
!i.~r States are opposed mainly because of the reiX!rcussions 
such action could have on EEC/US commercial relations.(*) 
, 
US rear:tions to the prorx,sals 
S. ·nv! Co::q1:;;sion expecterl stror1J us reaction to its 1;r·'>:)Os-il.s a.'ld 
this has been forthcoming. The :t?;!\t.,cr Stat~s in'.U vi'Ju,1lly and· 
c•Jlltor:ti vn ly as well ac; the Conrnission have OC'en .f loodud Wl th 
,\ s<>t·i<':-. of a'l.TOnitions, both throu,Jh the prcs5 ancJ throuJh 
off1c..:ial chunnels, about the danJcrs of pressin;J forward with 
th·.~ CGF pro1X)sal. · There have:! also been inf ormt.11 pressures, of 
·i.1 un:1cc·.!1)table kind, ·that the US would retaliate by cuttirg off 
Ei:C cxj'.:,orts - which they are not entitled to do under GA'IT rules 
by unilateral action. 
6. 'nle 
(a) 
,lr':JU~nts used· by the us cas broa.ily be surrr.1.1rized as follows: t\ 
the birdi,1~ on CGF · was i\(r JOtiated in the J<e~edy Round 
anJ resulted in corre~;:x>ndin;J US-concessions: 
States did not object to a Conmission proposal asking for consul-
tations with the us under GATI' Art. XXII : 1 on the evolution of 

















..· . '. 
/ 
I 
(b) breachiBJ the GA'IT concession ~uid set an W'ldesirable 
precedent (soya in the pipeline?): 
2.-
(c:) trade rC!strictions on CGF ~uld undermine the free tra.:iirq 
system.and result in a rrDre 1encralized VS/EEC tr~ war, 
so playing into the hands of those who seek to increase· 
protectionism. · · 
Commission• s .. viewpoint 
·. 7. '!he ConmiRsion wants to reduce t'GF injX)rts: 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.... 
Whether or not clcliberately the us side· continues to refer to 
a ·renc-Joti,1tion of the duty en CGF anJ in son-.? ·case5:: even to Unbin:iinJ • 
'f'1is 1.-1tt,?r rx:>int. is not· Cf>rr~t. 'I'll'.! C0::\11i.ni,">,l ~.'I~ .,.:,ke1 for 
a 1~,ndate to negotiate a tem~orary modification ot tne binding 
whi~h W'.>uld be z:eplaced by a tariff ryuota calcul at.ecJ on the 
b..1sio.; of irnports in, 1981 (about· 3 i1 tonnes) and for which the 
1.1 ~re, < ~.!:Y w:.,uld continue to be ar\11 ~cc:J ! ~E:. compensation to be 
flJr('1'1.t r.1utua~ ~uld 00 .l~mited to any incre~e in exports above 
3 11 ton; 1c.:; which t'he US could show would be denied to them by 
t h ~s tempor' ary system. · .. 
. •. 
. ..... . 
8. '.!'1~ 9"!1'-b!n~i!_~:J_i~ ~~ ~~~~~~!r-r _ ... :.· ':· . 
. 1; ~... • ... ~ - . 
'rlis is nQt correct. l\rticle x:~nl-{'6?, f~e Gl','IT· is specif ica.liy 
cJr·~i ·1r,r• J ~o perm.it Contract1_r:1 Parties to ur;.bir:f or rr.:n~oti.at~ 
cr:>nc<.:: .. sions. A9 such it has ~n u.s,"Cl.,,in the pa.c;t by both sides, 
c1nd :loe:. not therefc,re crei!t.E· a precf'den~. By r..efusing to ne:;otiate 
thP. us ~iouid deny us our GATI' pight.s and wul d behave irrE"l-iflOnsibly. 
. ' 9. ~~i~n-O!_l ~ 4:--i;_ a_P!:e!t~e_ t~ !11!:t~~ EI'~P2S!l! !s~y!) ! 
In pror:x,siDJ action on brans, manioc and CGF the C.Orrmission has 
coQClu~k·d it.s examination of the cereal substitutes IJI"oblem "'hich 
it un,iertook as part of _the 'mandate' proposals sµbmitted to 
the COuncil. , 
Ott¥ar points 
10. The Cor.mi~sion's prorx,s.:1ls on cer£>al substitutE:·s mu~t be placed 
in the broajer context of thr;• Conmunity's efforts .to bring about , · 
a better balance in its cereals sector. The measures taken in 
parallel to realign.EEC support prices with correspond~ US 
.(lC"ices are·to the a:lvantage of the overall export'interests 















Divergencies of approach in East-West economic relations still exist 
between the US and the EC. This is due, on the one hand, to some difference 
of interests at stake, anct to a different assessment of the appropriate 
policy measures to be taken vis-a-vis the USSR and the Eastern·European 
.. countries on· the other hand, although there is no basic difference in the 
analysis of the si.tuatioq. · ' 
. ' / 
/ \ . 
a) Different interests at stake 
-----------------------~~---• 
~. The inportance of the USSR and its allies .in cor.rnercial tenns is nllch 
, • .,,,.;.-e...,. r.,,.... •'J..c. ':',,.. ':t:.,._r' ·&,...,.--~c. ~·c , .. r ... c.,,""!"Jc.,i,- ...... c. '::'C'c: ___ ... ~c:._ ·,,-_._"':. 
~· ~ ... --.... ~ .. _,,.,. -4 .. -:,..;, --'- ···- 4-· ···-'--. .J -, -·- - - ~ • 
;·.-:1.~<:ern :.l.i.t''Jf.e, a.".ld es~c::.allz the CS5rt, re·,eals .a g!'Owirig :.7.bala.,ce , 
to our disadvantage. For several Mer.lber States, cor.mercial relations 
with the USSR and Qther Eastern Eur<?pe.an,...states are fO important that 
a radical chaIXJe in policy.would'l~ to considerable damage to their 
own economies. .- ~ · ·• -:\~: :., ... ,-:,- ·. · - .. 
• . .- I 
- Al.so with regard to security of energy·supplies the EC is in a much 
weaker situation than the US and the oppor:uni ty to .buY Soviet natural gas in 
. order to diversify our gas imports also cau~ed tensions with the us. 
· The Reagan administration is afraid that the EC would become too 
dependent on the USSR for its natural gas supplies, a 1factor which 
could weaken Western Europe's econanic and political strength, In 
addition to the security of supply aspect, the EC has also a much. 
bigger stake in cooperating with the USSR on the gas pipeline. Indeed, 
a natural gas deal with the USSR would also involve important sales 
from several F.C Member States to the USSR for the construction and · 
maintenance of this pipeline. 
Here the US would li~e to see the F.C to be more cautious in terms of 
transfer of sensitive technology to Eastern Europe, a question which 
is only part of the more general US reluctar.t:e regardin;J transfer of 
technologies to the.USSR and its allies. 
b) Different_ as~essment of measures_ to be_ taken_cqainst _the_ USSR and 
~~ Europe· 
•,h._. ..... .) (J . ·.- .. ~. ·,. 
.. .~ ........ . 
- 'nle US.is impatient with Community reluctance to take firmer steps 
in c~cial measures against the USSR, especially in.the context 
of receht and current developnents in Poland. The Communi~y coun-
tries generally do not consider that economic pressures are likely 
to lead to any rapid charqe in the policies adopted by the USSR, 
and that 'on the contrary, miscalculated pressures may lead to a 
./. 





.. 2 _; 
worsening of the ~i tuation. Al though it was hoped for some time 
that the US had accepted the natural gas deal between several 
Western European countries and the USSR in exchan:Je for a more 
restrictive credit policy of the West vis-a-vis the USSR and 
Eastern Europe, this hope was crashed by the 18 June 1982 decision 
of President Reagan to extend the December 1981 sanctions on the 
export of oil and gas equipnent to the USSR through the adoption 
of new regulations to include equipnent produced by subsidiari~ ! 
of US companies abroad as well ·as equipnent produced under licences 
issued by US companies. This decision which is in conflict with 
Versailles Sunmit d~larations and which raises the question of 
extraterritorial applicability of US law, 1 will undoubtedly add to 
existing tensions in other areas of US/EC relations, such as steel, 
agriculture and export credits • 
.I 
/ . 
- This divergence of views on what policy to develop vis-:-a-vis the 
USSR with re:;1ard to ttt~'Polish situation·reflects a basic difference 
between the US and Western Europe in tl)eir. approach to the USSR and 
its Eastern European ¥lies. Al_though we share similar concerns, the 
EC col.D'ltries are inclined to.avoid any policy of increasing confron-
tation and stress the importance of trying to continue some form of 
dialogue or further detente with the East •. 'rhe. decision of the 
recent NA'ro Surrmi t in Bonn reflects. -.this ,concern of Western Europe. 
But the saoe , Surrmi t also con~-.~ $?S,l}~lusions reached at ~ 
· Versailles Sumrrit with regard·to East/West trade relations which 
opted f~r a cautious and diversified policy including: 
... ,, ---~ .... 
- the improvement of the international system for controlling 
exports of strategic goods to the USSR anc· Eastern -Europe and 
national arrangements for tjle enforcement.·of securit:( controls: 
- the exchange of information within OECD on.all aspects of econanic, 
· carmerci"al and financial relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe ; 
. . 
- the necessity to observe great caution and sound economic principles 
in establishing,financial relations with these countries including 
the need for cormnercial prudence in limiting export credits.-
The conclusions reached at Versailles and Bonn represent a canpromise . 
which is unlikely ·to satisfy for long the American wish to see l1m'e 
active s~ taken to rest:I"ict credit to the USSR. · 







DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporations> 
This has been a contentious point between the US.and the EC since the 
introduction of the DISC Legislation in 1972. The DISC Legislation· 
concerns taxation fa.,i::ilities for profits draw·n from export activities-
from the us territory. The Commission has always regarded these 
facilities as export· subsidies,. an opinion not sharedoy the us 
Administration. · · · ; -
/ . 
The GATT Council adopted in December 1981. a report by .an investi-
gating panel "that ttfe. DISC Legislation. in some cases·- had effects 
which were not in accordance with ••• Article XVI.4.". 
On 29 April 1982 the Commijsi6n submitted to ihe GATT Secretariat a 
communication to the other contracting parties in which it e-xplained 
that the EC requests the ~AT~Council to recomm~nd, in confofmity with 
Art. XXIII : 2 that the us ra·pfdly take appropr.i ate measures in order 
to make the DISC Legislation confonn ·witit GATT stipulations.. It may 
be recalled here that also -atnada··feque-sud on. 3 March 1982 th.at the 
US promptly notify the DISC subsidy in accordance with Art. XVI: 1 of 
the GATT and pursuant to Article 7 C3) __ Q..f the. Subsidies Countervai'liny 














EXPORT CREDITS : CONSENSUS 
~~s,'!5'°..rabl~ differences of view remain between the EC and the · us on 
· this topic·, ·with' the "US'"look:i.ng for higher market-related consensus 
rates, while the EC has attempted to limit any rise in rates, parti-
cularly for developihg countries. ..-,... 
-. 
In view of amending the "consensus" reached within OECD in November 
1981, Mr. Wallen, c;hairrnan of the "conse-.,sus" group had ma1e a com-
promise'proposal in early May 19~2. · 
I . . 
The main provisions cif'the compromise proposal were an increase in 
minimum interest rates (1.25 % for-relatively rich countries /c:ate-
gory 1 / and around 0.5 % for intennediate countries /category 2 /. 
These increases would be combined with a·reclassification of buying 
countries witHin the frarnewor~ of the "consensus". This would lead 
i.a. to reclassifying the USSR;· the GDR and~Czechoslovakia into cate-
gory 1 as well as to uwrading a_number --of NIC 's into category 2. 
The reclassification of the ...t,J~R mto category 1 of buying countries ·. 
was suggested by the Corranunity at the Rarch Consensus meeting. '!he 
compromise also envisaged a charge in the regime for low interestrate 
countrfes (Japan), a margin of 0.·3 % to be applied to these countries' 
commercial lending rates of interest. · 
The COmmunity had obtained extension· of the deadline for accepting 
the Wallen proposal until June 15, 1982. 
After careful study of the Wallen proposal, the COmmission informed 
the Consensus group participants on June 15, that the Community cannot 
accept the Chairman's proposals but that the Cotmrunity is ready to 
reopen negotiations as soon as possible to establish new terms for a 
modified arrargement. The Cormruni ty will propose several amendments 
to the Chairman's proposals and thinks it advisable to negotiate them 
in Paris. 
However, 'since the US (and Japan) have indicated that they cannot 
accept any major charqes in the Wallen compromise, the Conmunity 












AIR CRAFT CASE 
-
/I I 
ANNEX y ~is 
- On May 28, 1982 an American company, Commuter Aircraft Corporation CCAC) 
filed a CVD complaint with the DOC and the USTR against imports of a 
large turbo prop commuter aircraft (the ATR-42) to be produced by 
Aerospatiale/Aeritalia) a French/Italian consortium. 
The comolaint alleges that subsidies are being given on ihe manufacture, 
oror.·~e:'!~ n -:,r exoort~tfon of i:or•11!'l!;t~r aircraft from France and Italy and 
that such imports are threatening to cause material injury to a US 
industr¥. The alleged s~bsidy .takes the form of subsidized interest rates 
reportedly with 80-85 X guarantees financing for 10 years.at 10.4 X interest. 
- The matter was submitted by the Commission ~o the 113 Committee meeting 




Thes~ arguments learl to the conclusion that there is no basis, in fact or 
in law, for the allegations c~ncernintj the vxisterice or the amount of the 
subsidy, concerning inj·ury, threat of injury or materia.l retardation of 
the establishment of an industry. The complaint does not contain suffi-
cient evidence of a "causal" l irik between the prefe.rent ia l financing and 
·.-. --. 
any injury. 
."-... _ .. , 
- These arg:..•ments were transmitt~to trfe~U.S"- 0A~th.orities 
and were also submitted to the US side during ·the GATT 
Ger.eva of 15 June. 
. .... -.~. 
on 11 June· 1982 
consultations in 
- In the meantime, the US International Trade tommission has instituted 















Annex vI. l 
.. 
Government Procurement Code 
1. Points on us implementation 
a) The US has excluded from their implementation of the agreement a number 
'" of non-warlike.materials ~urchased by the Defense De~ar;ment. Consul-
tat ions under Art. VII .3 of the GATT have led to· no result, but a solu-
.., 
tion may be found/in the bi lateral Mem~randa of Understanding between ; . . . 
US and Member States. in the NATO context Cal though t1i10 Member States 
\; ·.• . have still problems with this>. 
, . 
b) Certain aspects of' US tend,iring procedures "negotiated competition" 
procedure, single te~dering :cases for suppliers of uniqu~ ~apabil ity 
.·. -.... . . 
111ay infringe obl.igations of ·the· agreement·.: Oiscussion of this matter 




2. Buy-American Legislation at State~level 
. •. 
. ' .. 
. . 
. - - .,_ . 
The Community is also concerned at the number of States introducing regu-
lations to oblige their authorities to grant preferences to domestic sup-
pliers. This. type of regulation falls formally outside the _Agreement, but 
cont·ravenes "the sf,i rit of the Agreement" and the Strauss/Davignon exchange 
of letters in which US Administration agreed to avoid extension of such 
practices. 
3. US complaints against EC. 
The us requested consultations under Art. VII.6 of GATT, on the EC 
. 
practice of e~mination of VAT in calculating whether or not contract 
is above or below the agreement threshold.· The EC is trying to find 
some solution to this to avoid possible condemnation by a panel. 
'' 
Implemeri~tion by Italy has been unsatisfactory (in the Commission view). 
\ ~ 
Some improvement has occurr.ed since January 1982 in increased publication 
of contract notices, but this remains the main weakness in the Community 
position and a letter on this subject has been sent by the Commission to 
the Italian authori~ies. 
• 
An",.• VI B 
Application of Community Law to Multinationals 
There has appeared ov~r this ·last year criticism in the U.S. of Commission· 
proposals on company legislation in three areas -
1) the "Vredeling-Oavignon" proposal for a directive on employee information 
and consultation procedures; · 
2) the ~raft proposal on the substantive law of groups of enterprises not 
yet considered by th~ (011M11ission; 
·,· 
-3) the seventh proposed company la.w directive, now at an advanced stage 
in the Council. • 
. . / 
rhese criticisms have aiisen from representative bodies such as u.s. 
of Com~erce, in new~papers~~~d in th~ U.S. Cqngress (bill~ presented 
Houses>. Apart from some tPchnfcal criticisms (see addendum) main 








multin~tionals especially ~me~ican companies; 
.· .--. . 
that the proposals ·involve craims.- to ext'r1-territorial jurisdiction; 
~ : .,..::~~: '£:'"-:,- . . ' 
'that decisions of U.S. parent companies ~hich might •ffect employees of 
Community subsidiaries must be n'egotiated _ _in advance with labour-" 
representatives in Europe; -· 
that Community proposals are disctissed and:agreed in.secrecy. 
• . t 
Replies to these criticisms.can be formulated very briefly as follows • 
. Dic:cd"'in"tion_,1!J,1inc;t_multin-ltion,tl«; : Multinationals are not suhject to aore 
onerous trt'atment th,in other comp,1nies. The creation of a common 
framework, far from being a disadvantage to multinationals, will help to 
guarantt'e the continued' long-term development of their activities • 
. 
{!!!1:!~!C!!2!!!!_J~!!~1if!i~~: Great care has been taken to avoid legislativ• ~· 
-techniqu~s that would involve extra-territorial rxercise of jurisdiction. Only 
subsidiaries established in the Community ~re subject to legal oblf9ations. 
Turning to the draft ninth directive, companies from outside the EEC are affected 
by the text as it stands at present only when they take action within the 
intfrnal decision-making structure of Community companies. 
£2~~~i!~!i2~-~!!~-~~ei2l~!!: It.is proposed that where decisions are to be taken 
that directly affect the employees of Conununity subsidiaries, the management 
· of those subsidiaries should inform the employees' representatives in advance; 
he~r their views on the proposed changes; ~nd, where re~uested in c~rt~in ca~es, 
di -.cuo;•. wt th tt;i,em ine;isures to be t.1kcn with regMd to the employces. But tht·re 
ts no proposal~for a requirement that employee representatives should give their 
consrnt t'itht'r to the change itself or to the ineasures takt'n in relation to the 
t'IIIP l Oyt't' S • 
The Commission considers it important that employees be informed and consulted 
about 111=-i.<:!ahang~s that ·affect them. The period of economic difHculty in 
, which we are l iv fog; ·requirfng'°""as .. it does the re-structuring of 11any industrial 










....,, ....... _ 
- 2 -
,onsl•quences of change are well-managed and to improve the general level 
of understanding as regards changes that may well be disagreeable to many. 
At the same time, necessary structural changes must not be blocked and for t~is · 
reason the Commission has always rejected the notion that such changes be 
subject in law or in fact to a right of veto by employees. 
it£t!£X_2!-~2~!Y~i!x_er2£!!!: This criticism is without foundation. In a 
legislative process such as that of the Community, which is lengthy and open 
at all stages, there is simply no reason why a party affected by Commission 
propos3ls should.not be aware of them. 
A contributory factor in stirring up opposition is the potential impact of 
the Commission proposals on a small group of U.S. multinatiqnals controll!d 
by privately held corporations that iall outside the scope of U.S. securities 
· and exchange regulations. Community tompany l~w will have an impact on their 
operations much more far-teaching than U.S. fede·ral securities laws. In the 
field of group accounts ~or example, they wil( be treate~ iri the same way as 
quoted companies and will t.bus be required to.disclose information wMch they 














•• ANNEX VIC 
6. Energy Pricing Policies in U~A • 
. 1. The basic economic philosophy of the U.S. ~dministration as regards 
energy pricing was Hlustrated most vividly by the immedfate de.contra•. 
of oil prices as soon as President REAGAN took office •. It is based 
on a commitment• ~o unfettered market forces. 
2~ Unfort'unately, Pr<:sident REAGAN also inherited, in the Held of naturdl 
q.is, an industry with a history of decades of regu~ation1 fegislation 
on gas price controls which was the compromise result of bitter 
Congressio,:,al battles/prior to 1978, and a-,legislat.ive system requirfog 
Congressional approval for any change in this situation. Since 40 
million American househpt~s fear a doubling of the prices they pay for 
gas in the event of decontrol, h i_s not surprising that the pressure 
on Congress to maintain controls should ~e. Jtrong. The farm lobby and 
some parts Qf industry_are also.opposed. · 
I 
3. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the Administratior's 
basic commitment to decontrol nor· its view that the time has r.ot yet bee'l 
r;pe to attempt to push decontrol .\.eg-:islat.iQn··:through Congress • 
. - ~ : ~~~~~11~ •;._,t;·~~ . .. -
4. Commission pressure on the U.S. authoritfe~ ~~ this ~ubject has b~en 
expressed through three meetin1s of a U.S./Ec· petrochemicals stu~y iro~p 
(Decembe1' 19.80-June 1981), an exchange of'letters THORN/BROCK at tr.e enr.l 
of 1981 and, most recently, a Note Verbale co11111unicated to the U.S. 
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Section 337 of the·Tariff Act of 1930 
. 
' 
Annex VI p 
. 
Th;s section, entitled. simply "unfair practices in import trade", 
covers a broad range of commercial practices from patent infringement 
·ftrp~dator·y. pdcing,.. ... ,Most, .. r.ases have dealt with patent infringent. · 
.,, 
While the Community can have r,o objection to the. existe-~ce of a law 
whose effect should be the elimination of unfair pract;ces, several 
fe.atures have bee~ identified· in the ·administration o,f Section 337 to 
which objection can-...,be taken, or where improvement might be made. The 
'" .. ~ . 
. 
pro~Jsion is th_erefore regarded as a.ncm-tar.iff barrier, ~nd the Commis-
sion would wish to '.be able to enter in~o some tcr.r. of bi lateral discus-
sion with a view to improving. its operation. 
I • • • •. • 
, ..... i ... 1.. ... -
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Annex VIE 
Follow;ng representations by U.S. firms to the customs authorities.a number 
·of instances have ar;sen w~ere products have been reclass;fied for tar;ff 
purposes fo a category where a higher - sometimes much h;~her-rate of duty 
is applied. The most important and far reaching case is that of certain 
, ... 
traditional garments previously allowed to enter US in the_non ornemental 
category now placed in the ornamented one Cduty 35% or 42~5,X ad. val. instead 
oi 8%, or 37,5 t/lb + ~% ·ad val ~' !' The_ ~~rm of thi·s de~ision means that it 
could apply to a wide range of garments, with a very small" degree of ornamen- · 
~ r . . 
tat ion. Clearly, the diflerence may 'be o:, great i~pact on pri.ce. f;:t 
,Other products involved'.in such decisions include (the list is not exhaustive) 
plastic garment identification t~g~, writing ink containers, synthetic crystal 
. . 
quartz, wide-angle bicycle reflecto~~,.Jastfp leat'her. footwear uppers, speedo-
, meters and odometers us.ed as exe1"-ei~eri~:,~,,~~ . 
In fairness. it must be pointed out t~at not·-all requests to customs are met • 
.. 
For example the case of "moonboots", ·which wot:ld have raised the duty on this · 
. . . 
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Annex VI F 
SMpping 
1. Compet;tion policy 
Both the U.S. and the Community are in process of overhauling their 
• . . 
regulations for application of competit;on pol;cy to shipping •. There 
are however certain signif;cant differences in the_proposals, for· 
example the EC rule would permit "closed" Conferences, .the U.S. would 
only allow those open fo all ship owners; shippers' councils are 
,.- .. 
permitted in the EC proposal; not in the U.S. one~:, · Thes~ differences 
could lea~ to a clas~of laws which could make the actio~s of the 
. ..:::.7) 0 •. .. . . ' . . . ,. . . 
shipping lines·of'i'each ~tde iHegal und~r th~ other's code. Discussions 
will take place on 28/2~'June to ·start work towards finding a solution. 
2. Code of co.ndu·ct for Linder Conferences 
The U.S. does not intend· to apply this code •. They transmitted on 1 May 
. -
1981 an aide~memoire to Member· States~ and·t.he Commhsion referring to it 
........ , • .,....'.\'~& .. . 
and to the ·ec Regulation, inviting Membir"."'S'tates to hold consult'ations 
I • 
wHh the U.S. and to delay ratification •. _The U.S. view is that ratification 
• .. - -=--· :..:· 
~ . 
of the Code will 'flood the market in the North Atlantic with Third World 
shipping, and that ratification by Member St.ates will ·exclude the U.S. 
. . .. 
lines from participation in European trade as not conforming to the Code. 
This will also be discussed in the meetings of 28/29 June. 
3. The Jones Act , 
This act limits participation in coast wise trade of the U.S. to American 
flag vessels; literally that goods transferred between u~s. ports wi(l be 
carried only in Ame~ican ~hips. This has the ~ffect for example that a 
container ship lea·ving Rotterdam, with goods consigned to the LI.S. ports 
. of New York and Galves\on, must either discharge all its cargo in New York, 
I 
to be transhipped by a U.S. vessel, or must travel to Galveston with the· 
reduced - and therefore uneconomic - cargo. 
This is clea~ly a serious barrier to this service trade, especi,lly in 
















This is a system -of taxation applied by a number of States in the US 
Cin particular California> in levying tax on corporations operating 
in their territories: It involves calculation of liabiljty not by 
reference to their earnings in the territory ("direct ,net hod") but · 
by reference to a fraction of total world earnings based on the 
proportion of the ~a~es, payroll and pro-perty holdings in the state, 
to the world total· ("indirect method">.· This involves serious risks 
for double taxation. ,The OECD model convention for do~ble taxation 
agreements admits th~\ttindirect method"·only under special circum-
stances which cannot be regarded as satisfied in the cases in question. 
The Commission has, ~uccessfutly, urged th~ US to intervene a~ "amicus 
curiae" fo a case current Ly before the S1,1prer.1e Court, in whi eh the 
constitutional legality of the··unita·ry taxa~ion ,system is being· 
challenged,. _opP.,osing the system~- ,~· - .... · · · 














ANNEX VI H 
U.S. Copyright Act "Manufacturing Clause" 
This problem, although less prominent and of rather less economic importance 
than the others included in this repertoire, is included because of its 
acute topicality. 
The subject is Section 601 of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, which continues 
a provision~ dating back to~an enactment of 1981, which effectively prohibits 
import into u.s.A., of "non-dramatic literary works" in the En_glish language 
by authors who are U.S. nationals; and which are manufactured outside the 
U.S.A. Certain exceptions are made, notably the first 2,000 copies of each 
work,"and an exemption in/iavour of .Canada. I~troduced into the 1976 version 
of the clause is an automatic expiry date - 1s~ July 1982. 
~ .J' 
Congress has taken action in~ a bill introduced in July 19~1 to prevent this 
automatic expiry. The Community in its turn. has expressed its interest, 
insisting that the clause is contrary to GAT"ron two counts: first as a 
deliberate and arbitrary trade barrier, second in the discriminatory preference 
extended to Canada~ 
As it is now likely that ·the House ·of R.epr.esen'tatives will adopt· a BHl to 
extend the effect of the Clause, aAf.l as th~ Administration has Cwe understand> 
give~ its support, the Community has requested consultations on the subject 























Annex VI I ·· . ~ j_jf ?<. ·: 
U.S. Reciprocity.Legislation 
A dozen bills currently before Congress have been linked with the concept 
of reciprocity. 
' The motivations behind these bills were various. A general feeling of 
frustration at a perceived rise of protectionism in world markets was one, 
the desire to react against Japanese obstinacy in not dismantling non-
tariff barriers more quickly was another, the desire to expand and open up 
world trade in services and high-technology goods and to dismantle f.oreign 
investment controls was a third. · · 
The concept of reciprocity,. as reflected in some of these ·bills, could have 
created severe problems.· Being viewed in many cas~s as a concept applying., 
.. to bilateral relations, it was at variance with the basic multilateral 
character of GATT and with its MFN principle, and the Commission pointed 
this out to the U.S. authorities in a Note Virbale on this subject transmitted 
on 22 March. 1 
\ 
~ :.• It is not yet clear whether any of the billi concerned will emerge fro~ 
Congress in this session, and time is getting-short~ The bill which is furthest 
advanced is Senator Danforth's ''Reciprocal Trade a~d Investment Act of 1982" 
whi eh was reported by the Sena.te Finance Comini ttee on June 17, to the Full 
Senate. In the House; the .Florio:eill emerged from ~ub~Committee on 16 June. 
As a result of Administration pressure and views., expressed by the private 
sector, the formal reciprocity provis-iQrts ·ot·:1;hese bills have largely been 
dropped. Their general thrust i~ow' to~.,gi.ye.,the President a mandate to 
negotiate an opening-up of international ·trade· inJ·services and a removal of 
barriers to foreign .investment, while strensf:!hening his .already existing powers 
l:o take retaliatory action against those countries maintaining unjustifiable 
or unreasonable restrictions (as~ r~sult of tne denial of_ rights under 
international agreements or of national .treatnum.t>. 
··-
-·--
' Posit ion of USTR '~. 
The latest version of the Danforth Bill has the im~lfcit support of the 
Administration, and in particular of the USTR. It appears that USTR has been 
prepared to accept the retention of wa~ered-down reciprocity. provisions, which 
it originally. did not C.ant', in return for the Bill's provisions leaving the 
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THE COMMUNITY'S EXTER~AL TRADE : WORLD, U.S., CANADA, ~APAN, AUSTRALIA, N.Z. 
(Millions of Dolla~s> 
1974 1975 




World (ex.EC) 156 008 155 660 · 
U.S. · 24 262 25 558 
Canada 4 778 4 380 
Japan 5 219 5 988 k 
-Aust-ral ia 1 979 . 1 991 
New Zealand 1 02a . A41 
EFTA 24 403 25 119. 
~ xport s C fob) 
World <ex.EC) 136 235 150 400 
U.S. 18 977 16 380 
Canada . 3 020 . 3 167 
Japan 3 303 2 763 
Australia 2 893 .2 642 
New Zealand 909 778 
EFTA 33 334 ·<~ 4"-Q -- .......... _ 
8alance 
-·· 







5 285 - 9 179 
Canada 
-
1 758 - 1 213. 
Japan 
-
3 109 - . 3 225 
Australia 915 651 
~f¥AZealand - ~2 - '63 
I . 8 931 8 549 
ource: Eurostat : Monthly Trade Bulletin 
Special Number 1958- 1980 & No 4 - 1982 










178 174 197 608 
28 286 29 432 
4 873 . 4 914 
7 149 . 8 .732 , 
2 520 2 396 
935 .1 .030 . 
27 817 31 995 
l· . 
' . 189 8j4 .· .. ·. ·: -~: 157 748 
1,8 149 , • 23 429[ ... 
. : 3 100 ''· . 3 489 . 
3 040 1 3 5.~i r 
2 689 -. 3 .049 ': 
679 , · .1~1 · ~ .. 
~7 1,:9 , :(/;"!, 7cs'. 
.. 



























' 227 165 29$ 968 378 082 
35 554 4"1 098 61 609 
5 056 t, 982 
.. 8 505 
· ·11 102 '- 13 417 17 351 ,_ 
--2 409 3 __ 244 3 441 . 
, ?(9- · 1 464 
l 1 51& 
- 4.1 847 ¥ 036 68 059 
-· 
. 
221 617 266 032 312 496 
29 432 34 321 36 989 
4 058 4 599 4 718 · 
4' 748 6 346 6 362 
3 6~0; ... 4 036 4 288 
· 854 1 025 933 
49. 95~ .J5 C91 79 393 
·--· 
. • . 
... · .. 
. ,- 5 548 - :32 936 -65~ 587 
-
6 122 - ,12 777 ·.' .. -24.625 
~ 998 
-
. 2 383 
- 3 786 
-
6 354 - , 7 071 -10 989 . 
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ance .. - . 4 102 
·aly 3 132 
~therlands • .-!;. 2 959 
· lgium/Luxembourg . 1 941 
d ted K i n~dor.i 5 386 . 
·elancf 247 
·nmark (Greece> 601 . 
. 
ita l ,24 262 
ts to USA (f.o.b.) 
-~rmany 6·696 
-ance 2 241 




:lgium/Luxembourg 1 584 




)ta l 18 977 
ice 
?rmany 1 300. 








- 1 754 
,eland 9 
~nmark 
- · 150 
)ta l . (Greece) 
- 5 285 
tC-US IMPORT-~XPORT TRADE: BY EC ME~BER STATE 
<million dollars> 
-- 1975 1976 1977 1978 
, 
5 788 6 971 6 922 8 197 
4 082 4 721 · · 4 894 5 968 
3 361 · 3430 3 283 3 817 
. 3 474 ·3 627 3 890· 4 555 
-1 954 2_>166 2 428 2 794 
5 997 (i -374 6 662 8. 877 
272 358 381 534 
630 637 760 ·, 812 
• 
' 
25 558 28 286 29 220. 35 554 
. . -
,i; 
5 349 5 722 
·~ .s4a~:. · 10 013 
2 044 , 2 527 ' '26"6' . 4 273 
2 283 2 403 i.,.,. . ·. 3 1002. 
. . . 
·3 990 
965 1 139 '~k·497 1 657 
1 174 1 164 ::M: 571 ·1 13,49. . ... _, 
3 911 4 4.31 . · ''t:S 386 6 626' 1-:. .•• 
195 231 I ··,~·273· 350 
~-
/ I . ~ 
459 ~31 . '> • ·582 · · 674 
-
:1 '. •;,. 
' 
-11, 380 18 149 23 419 29 432 







- f' 249 · 920. -1 816 · 
- 2 038 - 2 194 - 1 628 -1 695 
.. 
- 1 078 





- 2 509 - 2 488 
- 2 393 
' 
-2 898 
- 780 - 1 002 
-
851' -· 945 
- 2 086 l . - 1 943 ' ' 
- 1 276 -2 251 
- 77 127 1; 108 184 - - -
-
- 171 - 106 - 178 - 138 
- 9 179 
-10 137 
- 5 801 -6 122 
r;e: Eurostat: Monthly Trade Bulletin: Specfal ~umbPr 1958-1980 & No 4 - 1982 
:N{ j_t,: 
• ...... 
. . •·. -~ 
·.;. .... .... ' .~. 
. 1:· 
.... """""' . 
• 





1979 1980 1981 I 
: I . 10 ·431 . . 13 509 12 064 
·a 094 ·. 10.761 8 794 
S 278. - 6 679 6 195 
- . 6 747 S 661 ! 6 264 I ··5 494 3 988 4 456 
11 962 I 1.5 91_8 _ 14, 483 
722 , 874 1 086 
96°1 l 1 273 1 1~9 
. 
' 47 098 I 61 256 55 321 
' . I 
. 
. ' . ( 
. 
. 
11 332 11 651 11 565 
. 4 792 4 933 5 605 . 
4 662 3 822·· 5 155 
. 1 785 1 859 2 238 
2 104 2 183 2 329 
~ ·' ' 8 584 10 820 12 502 
350 446 490 
712 787 878 
'lt'71:' 







- 1 858 
-
499 , . 
... 
- ~' 3 302 .;. 5 828 -3 189 
-
. 616 - 2 857 -1 040 
-
3 876 • 4 888 -4 026 . 
-
1 884 • 3 311 -2 127 
- 3 378 -· 5 099 - 1 981 
- 372 .. 429 - 596 
- ~1..9 i- 486 - 642 
- 82 
- 12 776 .. 24 758 -14 184 
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